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29	
	McTaggart	then	assumes	without	additional	argument	that	the	same	mechanics	are	in	play	in	the	case	of	instantiation	of	temporal	properties	of	pastness,	presentness,	and	futurity,	thus,	in	effect,	positing	a	second-order	A-time,	Thus	our	first	statement	about	M	–	that	it	is	present,	will	be	past,	and	has	been	future	–	means	that	M	is	present	at	a	moment	of	present	time,	past	at	some	moment	of	future	time,	and	future	at	some	moment	of	past	time	(NE,	§331).	This	unargued	assumption	can	be	represented	analogously	to	that	in	Figure	3	as	follows:			 Fig.	4	Temporal	property	instantiation	over	time.		It	appears	that	McTaggart	is	taken	in	here	by	the	grammatical	similarity	between	statements	expressing	ordinary	and	temporal	property	instantiation.		For	him,	for	instance,	“x	is	red”	is	on	a	par	with	“x	is	past.”		And	since	being	red	is	always	being	red	at	some	moment	of	time,	McTaggart	surmises	that	being	past,	present,	and	future	is	too	always	being	past,	present,	and	future	at	some	moment	of	time.		This	reasoning	leads	McTaggart	to	the	conjecture	that	the	instantiation	of	A-properties	always	involves	a	higher-order	A-time,	because	being	a	process,	it,	as	all	processes,	must	unfold	over	time.		And	since	past,	present,	and	future	cannot	unfold	over	






































McTaggart’s	analysis	of	simple-tense	predications	that	is	of	crucial	importance	to	understanding	McTaggart’s	temporal	transience	paradox.		The	following,	I	believe,	is	the	essence	of	McTaggart’s	analysis	of	simple-tense	predications:	(i) “e	is	past	in	the	future,”	=	“there	is	a	future	moment	t,	such	that	e	instantiates	pastness	at	t	and	t	is	not	an	element	of	the	first-order	A-series,”	(ii) “e	is	present	in	the	present,”	=	“there	is	a	present	moment	t,	such	that	e	instantiates	presentness	at	t	and	t	is	not	an	element	of	the	first-order	A-series,”	(iii) “e	is	future	in	the	past”	=	“there	is	a	past	moment	t,	such	that	e	instantiates	futurity	at	t	and	t	is	not	an	element	of	the	first-order	A-series.”	It	is	these	P-at-t,	N-at-t,	and	F-a-t	relations	which	bring	about	the	vicious	infinite	regress	of	temporal	attributions.		Apparently,	instantiations	of	pastness,	presentness,	and	futurity	over	time	commits	us	to	a	second-order	time	because	the	process	of	exemplification	of	temporal	properties	is	prima	facie	a	process	over	a	second-order	time	since	relations	the	P-at-t,	N-at-t,	and	F-at-t	are	essentially	t	¢-at-t	¢¢	relations.		And	since	McTaggart	explicitly	states	that	this	second-order	time	is	A-time,	“But	every	moment,	like	every	event,	is	both	past,	present,	and	future”	(NE,	§331),	we	are	dealing	here	with	the	exemplification	of	first-order	A-properties	over	a	second-order	A-time.		The	same	goes	for	second-order	pastness,	presentness,	and	futurity;	they	too	are	exemplified	successively	because	they	are	no	less	incompatible	with	one	another	than	the	first-order	temporal	properties,	and	so	on	ad	infinitum.	
40	
The	crux	of	McTaggart’s	paradox	is	not	that	events	instantiate	all	three	temporal	properties	at	once,	they	in	fact	never	do,	but	that	the	instantiation	of	A-properties	entails	infinite	regress,	or	if	not	then	we	have	a	contradiction.		What	McTaggart	should	have	said,	therefore,	is	that	we	have	only	two	alternative	scenarios:	either	A-properties	are	instantiated	simultaneously	or	successively.		And	then	he	should	have	shown	that	neither	alternative	is	viable.		This	would	have	been	decisive.		Instead,	he	has	chosen	to	posit	an	unargued	assumption	that	the	contradiction	arises	at	the	first	level	of	instantiation	only	to	disclaim	it	immediately	thereafter	as	patently	nonsensical;	he	then	again	reintroduces	it	at	the	second	level	and	so	forth.		This	unwieldy	strategy	can	be	completely	avoided	if	we	take	the	temporal	transience	paradox	to	be	not	the	conjunction	of	(1)	and	(2),	but	as	a	dilemma.		So	construed,	the	paradox	has	the	form	of	a	catch-22:	either	pastness,	presentness,	and	futurity	are	instantiated	simultaneously,	which	is	a	blatant	contradiction	or	if	not,	they	are	then	instantiated	successively,	and	thus	over	a	second-order	A-time	and	so	ad	infinitum.		Whichever	horn	of	the	dilemma	one	chooses,	the	outcome	is	the	same	–	the	reality	of	A-time	must	be	rejected.		Despite	the	numerous	deficiencies	of	McTaggart’s	exposition	of	the	temporal	transience	paradox,	when	critically	and	charitably	construed,	it	conveys	a	singularly	potent	metaphysical	result	–	the	notion	of	temporal	transience	is	essentially	incongruous;	and	as	such,	it	is	without	any	ontological	import	whatsoever.	1.5.2 I	take	the	intended	general	structure	of	McTaggart	argument	against	the	reality	of	time	to	have	the	following	form:	(1) time	º	A-series	 (the	essentiality	conjecture),	
41	
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